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SURVEY OF COMMERCIAL AERIAL NAVIGATION LAW IN LATIN AMERICA
JULIUS I. PUENTE*

INTRODUCTION
Nothwithstanding that international aerial navigation in Latin
America has developed much slower than in Europe and the United
States as an active accessory to commerce, yet, most of those countries -early manifested a lively interest, theoretically, at least, in
the formulation of, or adhesion to, an international code for the
regulation and control of air traffic:1 an interest which has, with
many of them, lately assumed a very definite practical attitude, and
has prompted the more progressive of them to undertake the framing of suitable local regulations to meet their own specific needs in
the novel sphere of commercial aerial navigation. But international
conventions in regard to this type of navigation, as all conventions
attempting to define or regulate matters of general interest to the
Society of Nations, can only set certain basic flexible juristic principles in a broad conceptual mold, leaving with each State the greatest possible latitude of legislative action, within the basic. principles
laid down, to meet its own peculiar local problems.
The entire body of the territorial law in Latin America on this
subject is in a formative state, and as we shall see, there as in Europe and elsewhere, the crude expedient of applying to aerial navigation, by analogy, the rules appertaining to terrestrial and maritime
commerce, has been made use of in order to fill the legislative vacuity
in the domain of air law: a clear admission, beyond a doubt, of the
absence of juridical conceptions suitable to the novel problems con*Northwestern University School of Law.
1. Convention Internationale de Navigation Arienne, 1919. See also:
Convencion Ibero-Americana de Navegacion Aerea, 1926; Pan-American

Convention on Commercial Aviation, 1928.
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fronting them. This condition is not surprising, since the Latin
American countries cannot possibly be expected to borrow, except.
in a small measure, the details of this sort of legislation from other
quarters, owing mainly, to radical differences between their physical
position and problems and the position and problems of other countries. The details must be the outgrowth of the individual experience of each.
We conceive, moreover, that in the same measure as the peculiar
problems of a goodly number of those countries have forced them
into regional (as contradistinguished from general) conventions on
various matters of common concern, such as extradition and consular
rights,2 so the conventions of the future in Latin America on the
subject of aerial navigation will be inspired by a due regard for
regional interests; and we should not be at all surprised to find there
in the course of a few years, a series of local multilateral compacts
designed to cope the more effectually with the peculiar problems
arising primarily from territorial propinquity, commercial interrelations, or political exigencies. The practical-minded cannot conceive
how the pressing problems of aerial navigation can be successfully
handled, even in their broad outline, by a group of States brought
together by inconsequential intellectual or racial sympathies, as in the
case of the Convencion Ibero-Americana de Navegacion Aerea of
1926. In the abstract, Commerce, as the relentless and all-pervading
force that it is, cannot be circumscribed by racial or spiritual affinities, and it compellingly demands that the general problems which
it presents be handled along entirely utilitarian lines by associations
of nations possessing more or less identic material interests. In the
view thus taken, conferences composed only of Powers chosen from
a particular ethnic group, barely justify their own precarious existence, as they can serve but a theoretical purpose. Being in many
cases without common concrete national interests, the nations gathered at these conferences can only engage in an academic restatement
of such juristic principles as they might conceive to be of universal
application: principles which the same group of Powers may have
assisted in framing as members of more general and undoubtedly
more authoritative gatherings.
With these introductory considerations in view, we shall attempt
in this article, a summary discussion, with a minimum of theorizing,
of certain fundamental conceptions of the law of aerial navigation
2. Congreso Boliviano de Caracas, 1911; Central American Extradition
Conventions of 1887 and 1907. See Aerial Convention of Aug. 18, 1922,
between Argentine and Uruguay.
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in Latin America: conceptions which, because of their universality,
we could today rightfully consider as part of the common law of
nations.'
I.
JURISDICTION

In a national sense, that is, in the sense of territorial law, there
has never been any doubt in Latin America, about the right of the
private owner of the soil to ownership also of the atmospheric space
above it, conformably with the ancient maxim: qui dominus est so-li,
dominus est coeli et inferorum: a maxim which is reflected in some

of their legislation somewhat on the fashion of the Brazilian Civil
Code :'
"The ownership of the soil embraces whatever is above and below
it to whatever height or depth, and which is useful to its exercise."
Or, as the Civil Code" of Venezuela expresses the doctrine: the
ownership of the soil "embraces the ownership of the surface and
of everything which is above or below the surface." This ownership is "presumed to be exclusive and unlimited until proof to the
contrary."'
Such, then, being the juristic principle with respect to private
ownership of the soil and the air space above it, could it be possibly
contended that the ownership, or more accurately still, the sovereignty, of the State over the national domain, of which the privately-owned soil is but a fraction, would be less complete, less
exclusive or less unlimited than that of the individual over his
private estate? Of course no such contention could be successfully
maintained anywhere today. The legal presumption that the rights
of sovereignty over the air space are as complete and exclusive as
over the subjacent territorial domain and jurisdictional waters, is
so inescapable as to resemble-in fact, is-a juristic axiom. It is
a presumption which flows with perfect naturalness from the principle of self-preservation. Without it the conception of sovereignty
would be incomplete.
3. La Jeune Eugenie (1822) 2 Mason 409, Fed. Cas. No. 15,551.
4. Art. 526. See also: Blackstone's Commentaries, Bk. II, Ch. 2, p. 18;
Bury v. Pope (1687) 1 Croke's Rep. 118; Corbett v. Hill (1870), 39 L. J.
(N. s.) 547; Recasens v. Sociedad General de Telefonos (1909) 113 Jurisprudencia Civil 401 (Corte Suprema de Espana) ; Art. 905, Civil Code, Germany.
5. Art. 527.
6. Art. 527, Civil Code, Brazil.
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But whatever doubts, in an international sense, might have been
formerly entertained in regard to the jurisdiction of a State over
the atmospheric space above its territorial domain and marginal seas,
the legal opinion of the world on this question has finally become
crystalized in the principle definitely enunciated at the International
Air Navigation Convention of 1919, in these words :7
"The high contracting parties recognize that every power has
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory."
And in further definition of this principle

:"

"For the purpose of the present convention the territory of a State
shall be understood as including the national territory, both that of the
mother country and of the colonies, and the territorial waters adjacent
thereto."
Among the Latin American countries which are either signatories of, or have adhered to, this Convention, are Brazil, Chile, Cuba,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay: of
which Chile and Uruguay have thus far ratified it.
The principle of the Convention of 1919 has been restated, with
entire subserviency, in Article 1 of the Convencion Ibero-Americana
de Navegacion Aerea of 1926, of which Argentine, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Salvador, Uruguay and Venezuela, in addition to Spain and Portugal, are the signatories.
Two years later the Pan American Convention on Commercial
Aviation," put forth the following succinct statement of principle
on the question of jurisdiction, which also embodies every essential
element in the definition of the Convention of 1919:
"The high contracting parties recognize that every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory
and territorial waters."
The idea-the juridical principle-of these international compacts has been incorporated-out of abundant caution, we take itinto the municipal laws or regulations concerning aerial navigation,
of such of the Latin American countries as have legislated upon
that subject. Let us illustrate: in Argentine, the Executive decree of
7. Art. 1, par. 1.
8. Art. 1,par. 2.
9. Art. 1, Havana, 1928.
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September 4, 1925, provides that pending the regulation of the right
of aerial navigation by Congress:
"It is necessary to exercise the national sovereignty, exclusively of
every other sovereign State, over the air space within our boundaries and
jurisdictional waters."
Brazil, 10 and Chile," each provides that its jurisdiction shall be absolute and exclusive over the space above its "territory and its territorial waters"; while Cuba,'12 claims that its jurisdiction comprises
also "in a complete and exclusive way, the air space over its territory,
including therein its jurisdictional waters"; and Venezuela,' 3 pretends to the right to prescribe conditions to regulate the flying and
landing of aircraft over its territory, by virtue of the "sovereignty
which the State exercises over the air which covers the National
Territory and its territorial waters."
The object of these provisions is, of course, to establish, with
respect to foreign Powers, a jurisdictional claim over the national
domain, including the atmospheric space above it, which shall be at
once juridically complete-civilly, criminally and administrativelyand politically exclusive. As a lone star in the political firmament
of Latin America, the Republic of Panama has incorporated in its
Administrative Code,'" the thesis so earnestly, but hopelessly, contended for by M. Fauchille, 15 in 1910, that:
"The air is free. The State has over it only such rights as are
necessary for its proper protection, as well in time of peace as in time
of war."
This liberal doctrine, grounded as it is on considerations entirely
detached from the realities of international life, may be regarded
today as definitely unacceptable. It is at variance with the national
instinct of self-preservation.
Not content, apparently, with the general jurisdictional claim
to the air space put forward, with but one exception, by every State
in Latin America-a claim which, if admitted by other Powers, as
it certainly would be, carries with it the entire train of legal consequences flowing from its valid admission under International Law
-Chile'
has made further general provision to the effect that:
10. Art. 1, Decree of July 27, 1925.
11. Art. 17, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925.
12. Art. 1, Decree of Apr. 21, 1928.
13. Art. 1, Law No. 13477, June 21, 1920.
14. Art. 1967.
15. "Regime Juridique des Aerostats," Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit
International (1910), pp. 297, 299.
16. Art. 48.
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"The legal relations subsisting between persons arriving within the
limits of its territory and of Chilian territorial waters, on board a
national aircraft, shall be governed by Chilian law."
Needless to say, if a person, whatever his nationality, is on board a
Chilian commercial aircraft outside the territorial jurisdiction of
any other State, or is in Chilian territory, his rights and obligations
will be regulated by no other law than that of 'Chile. That doctrine
is too well settled in International Law to admit of the slightest
doubt. May we infer the purpose of this section to have been to
leave the determination of the relative rights and obligations of
persons coming to Chile on a foreign aircraft to the laws of the
State where the aircraft is registered4? Could it be that Chile is
seeking to renounce, by inference, what Brazil has renounced by the
following express enactment :"7
"The legal relations subsisting between persons arriving on board
a foreign aircraft flying over the national territory shall be governed
by the law of the flag of the aircraft, in so far as said law is not
repugnant to the national law in force."
This jurisdictional renunciation must be understood, however, as
extending to civil acts or relations only, for another portion of the
same law provides:
"However, in case of a crime or offense committed on board a
foreign aircraft, the Brazilian tribunals shall take jurisdiction if the
actor or the victim is of Brazilian nationality, or if the aircraft lands
in Brazil after the commission of the crime or offense."
Venezuela, too, has declined to join in any self-abnegation in
criminal matters, preferring, rather, to exercise its jurisdictional
rights under International Law; and thus she has provided that :18
"In case of a crime or offense committed by an occupant against
another occupant on board a foreign aircraft, when the crime has been
committed on the air space of the Republic, or when the victim or the
accused are of Venezuelan nationality and no prosecution has been
instituted in a foreign country, or if the aircraft has landed in Venezuela after the commission of the crime or offense, the Tribunals of
Venezuela shall be competent to take cognizance of the same."
There can be no doubt that the commission of a crime or offense on
an aircraft on the aerial domain above the territory and marginal
Waters of a State, would sustain a demand for the extradition of
the accused."9
17. Art. 46, Decree of July 27, 1925.
18. Art. 69, Law No. 13,447, June 21, 1920.
19. Puente, Principles of International Extradition in Latin America,
Michigan Law Review for May, 1930.
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But whether we speak of territorialor marginal waters adjacent
to the national domain, the question at once suggests itself: What is
the exact legal extent of the jurisdiction of a State over the atmospheric space above its marginal waters? Is it the traditional one
marine league or three-mile limit of International Law, or can that
jurisdiction be rightfully extended for administrative purposes over
the air space above those portions of the sea beyond the three mile
limitation as the States may also claim to be under their jurisdiction
for similar purposes? There is nothing in the wording of the international compacts or local laws relative to aerial navigation to
prevent such a jurisdictional extension for administrative objects;
although in Venezuela, the definition of the phrase "National Territory," in the law regulating aerial navigation, 20 as "The national
territory properly speaking and the territorial waters, when the intent
to make a distinction is not clear and express," would seem to keep
the application of the air law well within the jurisdictional limits
recognized by International Law. However, "hovering" statutes, as
they are now known, exist in many of the Latin American republics.
Argentine, for example, claims 21 ownership only of:
"The seas adjacent to the territory of the Republic, to a distance

of one marine league, measured from the low water mark; but the rights
of police for purposes connected with the security of the country and
for the enforcement of the revenue laws, extends to a distance of four
marine leagues measured in the same manner."
Chile,2 2 Salvador, 23 and Ecuador, 2 ' have identical Code provisions.

'There is no doubt that, legislation of that sort, is a valid exercise
of the national police power, even in the light of our own judicial
decisions. 21 Would, then, an act, whether civil or criminal, attempted
or committed and aimed at the territorial sovereign by an alien on
an aircraft of foreign nationalty, over this extension of the maritime
belt beyond the three-mile limit, be cognizable by local law, or should
it be considered as outside the jurisdictional competency of the local
sovereign? Or, suppose that the aircraft is caught flying over the
"territorial waters adjacent to the coast"-a phrase which might be
construed to include the extension alluded to for administrative and
20. Art. 74, Law No. 13,447, June 21, 1920.
21. Art. 2374, par. 1, Codigo Civil.
22. Art. 593, Codigo Civil.
23. Art. 579, Codigo Civil.
24. Art. 582, Codigo Civil.
25. Citurch v. Hubbart (1804). 2 Cranch (U. S.) 187, 235; Gillam v.
United States (1928) 27 Fed. (2d) 296. See also: Prof. Edwin D. Dickinson's instructive article, Jurisdiction at the Maritime Frontier, in 40 Harvard
Law Rev. 1 (Nov., 1926).
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police purposes-without having previously obtained permission to
do so, and that it is compelled by the civil and military authorities to
land, as it may be in Colombia by express enactment, 2 could the occupants of the aircraft or the craft itself be subjected to the sanctions
of the local law for an actual or attempted disregard of its provisions? We believe that the application of those sanctions would
be entirely permissible, in view of the admitted power of the State
to secure itself from injury even beyond the limits of its territory
and marginal waters.2 7 There are, as has been truly observed by
one of our ablest writers on International Law,28 many important
territorial inhibitions and regulations which are "peculiarly open to
violation from the sea. Some territorial interests are inadequately
protected by a narrow belt of territorial water and with respect to
others it has not been possible to establish at any point an arbitiary
and all-sufficient line. Indeed, ever since the modern conception of
a territorial belt in the marginal seas first developed, the necessities
of territorial security have been an obstacle in the way of agreement
upon the width of the belt and have confounded the attempts of
publicists or foreign offices to find a solution in simple rules." And
this peculiar susceptibility of certain territorial laws to violation from
the open sea, is now immeasurably increased from the air, owing,
as we can readily conceive, to the accessibility of the territorial
domain of a State by aircraft and the rapidity with which it may
arrive and depart over unknown routes; so that the self-same reasons
which compel acquiescence in the extension of the marginal maritime belt as a measure of national security, also compel acquiescence
in a corresponding extension of the marginal aerial belt beyond the
limit ordinarily sanctioned by International Law. The parallel is
so exact as to admit of no doubt. The situation is, of course, simplified in a small measure with respect to the signatories, when the
extension of the marginal waters for certain purposes has received
the sanction of international engagements, as in the Treaty of
Montevideo of 1889,29 on International Penal Law, which says:
"Territorial waters are, for the purpose of penal jurisdiction, those

comprised within five miles from the mainland and islands forming part
of the territory of each State.
26. Art. 18, Decree No. 559, March 15, 1920.
27. Church v. Hubbart (1804) 2 Cranch (U. S.) 187; Rose v. Himely
(1808) 4 Cranch (U. S.) 241; Gillam v. United States (1928) 27 Fed. (2d)

296.

28. Prof. Edwin D. Dickinson, in Jurisdiction at the Maritime Frontier,

40 Harvard Law Rev. 12, Nov., 1926.

29. Art. 12.
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The future cannot fail to show, in the proportion that air navigation grows in volume and frequency, that vigilance of the aerial
approaches to a State will be infinitely more necessary for military
and administrative purposes than of the maritime approaches, and
that the regulations now in force as to the latter will be clearly
inadequate as to the former. We foresee the nations accepting-and
necessarily so-a very wide latitude of local policy and practice in
the framing and enforcement of aerial "hovering" statutes, a latitude
which, we hope, will ultimately result in the adoption of correspondingly broad rules of customary or conventional international law.
II,
FREEDOM OF AERIAL NAVIGATION

Three years before the C. I. N. A. of 1919 met, Panama had
established as positive law, 3 0 the important principle that:

"Aerial navigation is free over the whole territory of the Republic,
without any other restriction than as provided-by law with respect to
certain portions of the atmosphere for the proper security of the State."
The doctrine of the freedom of aerial navigation which had
been ably put forth long prior to the Panama legislation, and has
been accepted in principle in the various International Conventions
on Air Law, is, in reality, a qualified concession, dictated by considerations of commercial convenience, to the proponents of the
rejected theory of the freedom of the air; a concession, we say,
because in the strictly juristic sense, there can be no greater right
to navigate freely the air superincumbent upon the territorial domain
than to pass innocently through the national territory proper without
the consent of the local sovereign, expressly or tacitly given.
When the great Convention of 1919 on International Aerial
Navigation committed its signatories to guarantee3 1 to each other in
times of peace the "freedom of innocent passage above its territory
to the aircraft of the other contracting States," and further, 2 that:
"Every aircraft of a contracting State has the right to cross the air
space of another State without landing," that eminent body of
jurists was simply restating in slightly modified phraseology but
without altering the substance, the self-same idea which had gained
currency among-scholars and had been made part of the positive
legislation of Panama.
30. Art. 1968, Codigo Administrativo.
31. Art. 2.
32. Art. 15.

THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW

The principle of the freedom of innocent passage was accepted
also by the signatories of the C. I. A. N. A. of 1926, 88 and of the
Pan American Convention on Commercial Aviation of 1928. 3
Although the principle of Conventions such as C. I. N. A.,
C. I. A. N. A., and the Pan American Convention, is to insure as
much as possible the continuity of aerial navigation between States,
many of the countries of Latin America, as Argentine, 5 Brazil,"6
Chile,17 Colombia, 8 Cuba,

9

Salvador, 40 and Venezuela,4 ' lay it down

that in the absence of conventional engagement, no foreign aircraft
shall land or fly over the national territory or marginal seas without
the permission of the local authorities previously secured. But in
Venezuela 2 authority may be "permanently given" in time of peace,
for foreign aircraft to land on national airdromes upon conditions
fixed at the time the permission is given. This permission is
"revocable at any time and will be granted only on the basis of
reciprocity." It may be withdrawn for military reasons, or for
reasons of public security, order or convenience,43 or it may be
temporarily or permanently restricted to certain zones.
This conventional right to navigate freely over foreign territory
imports also the subsidiary right to transport persons, merchandise
and mail between one country and another ;"4 subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by the local law of aerial navigation,'4
or the Codes of Commerce. 46 Aircraft engaged in international
navigation must arrive and depart over the route prescribed for such
traffic.4 7 The right of the State to reserve intrastate air traffic to
its national aircraft, has been everywhere recognized. This has
been done in Argentine, 8 and in Brazil. 9 In the latter country
33. Articles 2 and 15.
34. Arl. 4.
35. Articles 4 and 5, Decree of Sept. 4, 1925, and Art. 74, Decree of
July 30, 1926.
36. Art. 44, Decree of July 27, 1925.
37. Art. 18, Decree of Oct. 17, 1923.
38. Art. 18, Decree 559, March 15, 1920. Art. 16, of Law No. 126, of
Dec. 31, 1919, provides: "It is prohibited to cross the frontier in places
other than the routes designated, without first taking up the matter with the
authorities and securing the corresponding permit."
39. Art. 2, Decree of April 21, 1928.
40. Art. 17, Decree of May 17, 1923.
41. Art. 38, Law No. 13,477, June 21, 1920.
42. Art. 38, Law No. 13,477, June 21, 1920.
43. Art. 34, Decree of April 21, 1928; Art. 3, Law No. 13,477, June 21,
1920.
44. Art. 10, Decree of Sept. 4, 1925, Argentine.
45. Art. 71, Decree of July 22, 1925, Brazil.
46. Articles 575-589, Codigo Commercial Brazileiro.
47. Art. 53, Decree of July 27, 1925, Brazil.
48. Art. 10, Decree of Sept. 4, 1925.
49. Art. 70, Decree of July 22, 1925.
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coastwise traffic is reserved by the Constitution" to national vessels,
and this reservation has been extended to aircraft navigation by
Law No. 4,91151 of January 12, 1925. These restrictions upon intrastate navigation by foreign aircraft has been sanctioned as well by
the C. I. N. A.,

52

the C. I. A. N. A.,

53

as the Pan American Con-

54

vention.

There are certain conditions which a foreign aircraft entering
the national territory must observe, such as: (a) following a designated route; (b) landing at specified customs-airdromes; and (c)
departing within a given time.5 5 And there is but one cause that will
justify a disregard of those conditions, namely, vis majeur.56
As measures of public safety, too, the carriage by aircraft of
certain articles is prohibited, not only by the international compacts
to which the republics of Latin America are parties, but also by their
internal legislation. Among these articles may be mentioned: explosives, 7 arms and munitions of war,5 8 photographic and cinematographic apparatus,5 9 wireless and radiotelegraphic apparatus and materials for radio communication, 0 asphixiating gas,"' messenger
50. Art. 13.
51. Art. 19.
52. Art. 16.
53. Art. 16.
54. Art. 54.
55. Art. '6, Decree of Sept. 4, 1925 (No. 2366), and Art. 75, Decree of
July 30, 1926, Argentine; Art. 49, Decree of July 27, 1925, Brazil; Art. 15,
Decree No. 559, of March 15, 1920, Colombia; Art. 5, Law No. 13,477, June
21, 1920, Venezuela; Art. 18, par. 4, Pan-American Convention on Commercial Aviation, 1928.
56. Art. 78, Decree of July 30, 1926, Argentine; Art. 18, par. 5, PanAmerican Convention on Commercial Aviation of 1928.
57. Art. 82, Decree of July 30, 1926, Argentine; Art. 78, Decree of
July 22, 1925, Brazil; Art. 23, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile; Art. 11, Decree
No. 559, March 15, 1920; Art. 19, Decree of May 17, 1923, Salvador; Art. 26,
C. I. N. A.; Art. 26, C. I. A. N. A.; Art. 15, Pan-American Convention.
58. Art. 82, Decree of July 30, 1926, Argentine; Art. 78, Decree of
July 22, 1925, Brazil; Art. 11, Decree No. 559, of March 15, 1920, Colombia;
Art. 19, Decree of May 17, 1923, Brazil; Art. 26, C. I. N. A.; Art. 15, PanAmerican Convention.
59. Art. 98, Decree of July 30, 1926, Argentine; Art. 79, Decree of
July 22, 1925, Brazil; Art. 23, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925; Art. 11, Decree No.
559, March 15, 1920; Art. 30, Decree of April 21, 1928; Art. 27, C. I. N. A.;
Art. 27, C.I. A. N. A.; Art. 16, Pan-American Convention.
60. Art. 16, Decree of July 22, 1925, Brazil; Art. 11, Decree No. 559,
March 15, 1920, Colombia; Arts. 28, 29, Decree of April 21, 1928, Cuba;
Art. 12, Law No. 13,477, June 21, 1920, Venezuela; Art. 14, C. I. N. A.;
Art. 14, C. I. A. N. A.
61. Art. 82, Decree of July 30, 1926, Argentine.
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doves 6 2 products of State monopoly, 3 and the like. This general
prohibition extends to the carriage of the prohibited articles "either
between points ,situated within the territory of any of the contracting
States or through the same even though simply in transit,16 4 unless
special authority is obtained from the governments concerned.6 5
In like manner, considerations of military reasons or public
convenience and security often lead States to forbid aerial flights
over designated portions of the national territory. The countries
of Latin America, 6 have all inserted prohibitory clauses of this sort
in their local legislation; and the International Conventions,

7

em-

power the signatories to legislate in the prohibitory sense mentioned.
Article 5 of the Pan America Convention of 1928 authorizes each
contracting State to "prohibit, for reasons which it deems convenient
in the public interest, the flight over fixed zones of its territory by
the aircraft of the other contracting States and privately owned
national aircraft employed in the service of international commercial
aviation, with the reservation that no distinction shall be made in
this respect between its own private aircraft engaged in international
commerce and those of the other contracting States likewise engaged." Conformably with the right thus recognized, flights over
the following places have been forbidden by the local laws and
regulatio' )n aerial navigation of'Latin America: cities, villages and
other important gatherings ;6S fortresses and military posts;69 and
70
places or territory in a state of siege.
62. Art. 98, Decree of July 30, 1926, Argentine; Art. 78, Decree of
July 22, 1925, Brazil; Art. 23, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile; Art. 19, Decree
of May 17, 1923.
63. Art. 78, Decree of July 22, 1925, Brazil; Art. 23, Decree of Oct. 17,
1925, Chile; Art. 19, Decree of May 17, 1923, Salvador.
64. Art. 15, Pan-American Convention on Commercial Aviation, 1928.
65. Art. 78, Decree of July 22, 1925, Brazil; Art. 23, Decree of Oct. 17,
1925, Chile; Arts. 29, 30, Decree of April 21, 1928, Cuba; Art. 19, Decree
of May 17, 1923, Salvador.
66. Art. 9, Decree No. 2366, Sept. 4, 1925, Argentine; Art. 56, Decree
of July 22, 1925, Brazil; Arts. 20-22, Decree of October 17, 1925, Chile; Art.
1969, Codigo Administrativo, Panama; Art. 11, Decree of May 17, 1923,
Salvador; Arts. 20 and 21, Law No. 13,477 of June 21, 1920, Venezuela.
67. Art. 3, C. I. N. A., 1919; Art. 3, C. I. A. N. A., 1926; Art. 5,
Pan-American Convention of 1928.
68. Art. 9, Law No. 2366, Sept. 4, 1925, Argentine; Art. 57, Decree of
July 22, 1925, Brazil; Art. 30, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile; Art. 13, Law
No. 126, Dec. 31, 1919, Colombia; Arts. 14 and 15, Decree of May 17, 1923,
Salvador; Arts. 20 and 21, Law No. 13,477, of June 21, 1920, Venezuela.
69. Art. 13, Law No. 126, Dec. 31, 1919, Colombia; Art. 1969, Codigo
Administrativo, Panama; Art. 11, Decree of May 1.7, 1923, Salvador.
70. Art. 22, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile.
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Documents Required
As in the case of maritime navigation, so in aerial navigation, a
certain documentation has been generally thought necessary to create
a presumption of and establish the bona fides of air traffic. Among
these documents may be mentioned: (a) Certificate of registration
and airworthiness ;71 (b) Sailing permit issued by the State of registration ;72 (c) Certificate of fitness and capacity of the commander,
pilot, mechanics and other personnel ;73 (d) Certificate of health;"'
(e)

If it carries wireless apparatus, license therefor

;71

(f)

List of

passengers ;76 (g) Inventory of personal baggage ;77 (h) Bill of Lading, Manifest and Invoices, if it carries merchandise ;78 (i) Log
book ;7' and such other books as Aircraft book, , Motor book 8 and
2

Signal book.
71. Art. 84,,Decree of July 30, 1926, Argentine; Art. 13, par. 1 and 2,

Decree of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile; Art. 12, par. (a), Decree No. 559, March 15,
1920, Colombia; Art. 31, pars. 1 and 2, Decree of April 21, 1928, Cuba;
Art. 53, par 1, Law No. 13,447 of June 21, 1920, Venezuela; Art. 19, pars.
(a) and (b), C. I. N. A.; Art. 19, pars. (a) and (b), C. I. A. N. A.; Art.
10 (a) and (b), Pan-American Convention.
72. Art. 1984, Codigo Administrativo, Panama, Art. 53, par. 2, Law
No. 13,477 of June. 21, 1920, Venezuela.
73. Art. 84, Decree of July 30, 1926, Argentine; Art. 13, par. 3, Decree
of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile; Art. 12, par. (c), Decree No. 559, of March 15, 1920,
Colombia; Arts. 23 and 31, par. 3, Decree of April 21, 1928, Cuba; Art. 1984,
Codigo Administrativo, Panama; Art. 53, par. 3, Law No. 13,477 of June 21,
1920, Venezuela; Art. 19, par. (c), C. I. N. A.; Art. 19, par (c), C. I. A.
N. A.; Art. 10, par. (c), and Arts. 13 and 14, Pan-American Convention.
74. Art. 84, Decree of July 30, 1926, Argentine.
75. Art. 13, par. 7, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile; Art. 12, par. (f),
Decree No. 559, of March 15, 1920, Colombia; Art. 31, par. 7, Decree of
April 21, 1928, Cuba; Art. 53, par. 8, Law No. 13,477, of June 21, 1920;
Art. 19, par. (g), C. I. N. A.; Art. 19, par. (g), C. I. A. N. A.; Art. 10,
par. (g), Pan-American Convention.
76. Arts. 84 and 86, Decree of July 30, 1926, Argentine; Art. 13, par. 5,
Decree of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile; Art. 12, par. (d), Decree No. 559, March 15,
1920, Colombia; Art. 31, par. 4, Decree of April 21, 1928, Cuba; Art., 53,
par. 4, Law No. 13,477 of June 21, 1920, Venezuela; Art. 19, par. (d), C. I.
N. A.; Art. 19, par. (d), C. I. A. N. A.; Art. 10, par. (d), Pan-American
Convention.
77. Art. 31, par. 5, Decree of April 21, 1928, Cuba; Art. 53, par. 5,
Law No. 13,477 of June 21, 1920, Venezuela.
78. Art. 84, Decree of July 30, 1926, Argentine; Art. 13, par. 6, Decree
of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile; Art. 12, par. (e), Decree No. 599, March 15, 1920,
Colombia; Art. 31, par. 6, Decree of April 21, 1928, Cuba; Art. 1984, Codigo
Administrativo, Panama;'Art. 53, par. 6, Law No. 13,477 of June 21, 1920,
Venezuela; Art. 19, par. (e), C. I. N. A.; Art. 19, par. (e), C. I. A. N. A.;
Art. 10, par. (e), Pan-American Convention.
79. Art. 12, par. (g), Decree No. 559, March 15, 1920, Colombia; Art.
53, par. 7. Law No. 13,477 of June 21, 1920 Venezuela; Art. 19, par. (f),
C. I. N. A.; Art. 19, par. (f), C. I. A. N. A.; Art. 10, par. (f), PanAmerican Convention.
80. Art.)12, par. (g), Decree No. 559, March 15, 1920, Colombia; Art.
1984, Codigo Administrativo, Panama.
81. Art. 12, par. (g), Decree No. 559, March 15, 1920,. Colombia.
82. Art. 12, par. (g), Decree No. 559, March 15, 1920, Colombia.
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III.
CIVIL AND PENAL RESPONSIBILITY

Liability in the law of aerial navigation is classifiable into: (A)
Civil, and (B) Criminal. "Every person on board an aircraft," says
the -Colombian law, 8' "must abide by the laws concerning the general
security, military orders and regulations touching aerial navigation."
That is the general jurisdictional doctrine of municipal law: a
doctrine which has been expressly recognized in its correlative as
embodied in the Pan American Convention of 1928 :84
"Reparations for damages caused to persons or property located
in the subjacent territory shall be governed by the laws of each State."
These doctrines are a clear acknowledgment, on the one hand, of
(a) the territorialjurisdiction of the State, and, (b) the territoriality
of the law.
A.

Civil Responsibility

Notwithstanding the Civil Law doctrine15 of the private ownership of the atmospheric space above the soil, to which we have
adverted, there is at present no room for doubt, in view of the
enabling legislation of every country-legislation which must be
considered as in a sense restrictive rather than negative of the absolute right of private ownership of the air space-about the right of
aircraft to circulate over private property provided it causes no
damage or interferes with the primary right of ownership guaranteed by the Codes. 6 This right of navigation is subject, of course,
to a corresponding obligation, namely, the joint" liability of the
owner of the aircraft, the commander and the perpetrator of the
injury, to respond in damages, as the Chilian law puts it,88 for any
"injury caused by an aircraft to persons or things at the moment
of the take-off on a service flight, or in the course of regular transit ;"
although the liability is restricted in Salvador,89 only to the owner,
"without exceptions," for damages due to accident or negligence.
83. Art. 14 Decree No. 559, March 15, 1920, Colombia; Art. 60, Law
No. 13,477 of June 21, 1920, Venezuela.

84. Art. 28.
85. See cases cited under Note 4 for the Common Law doctrine.
86. Art. 47, Decree of July 22, 1925, Brazil. See also, Art. 526, Civil
Code, Brazil.
87. Art. 84, Decree of July 22, 1925, Brazil; Arts. 1518 to 1553, Civil
Code, Brazil; Art. 53, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile; Art. 63, Law No. 13,477
of June 21, 1920, Venezuela.
88. Art. 53, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925.
89. Art. 5, Decree of May 17, 1923.
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This liability is mitigated under the law of Chile, ° "if the victim
is partly responsible for the accident, or if he has exposed himself
to injury." According, again, to Chilian law, 1 the party injured by
the aircraft has the right to be indemnified "without it being necessary for him to establish the negligence or intentional fault of the
wrongdoer, unless the injury is imputable to the victim." Under
the law of Brazil, 2 in case of jettison or forced landing on private
property, the owner cannot prevent the removal of the airplane
unless some damage has been done to his injury, in which case he
may oppose its removal until the arrival of the competent authorities.

In Chile, too, the commander of the aircraft enjoys9 3 the right

to jettison, along his route, any articles of merchandise on board,
if he finds it "necessary to the safety of the aircraft." "No responsibility is assumed by the carrier," it adds, "with respect to the
consignor or consignee on account of the said merchandise. But
liability will subsist for damages caused upon the surface." By
article 68 of the Chilian law, the wrongdoer is made liable under
articles 490-492 of the Penal Code,"0 for damage done to persons on
the ground. But, discussing further the law of Chile, we may add
that that country has gone considerably farther than her sister republics in materially relieving the carrier from liability, for she has
provided :95

"The carrier may, by express agreement, relieve himself from liability to which he might be subject by reason of the risks of the air or
of acts done by any person employed on board in the management of
the aircraft; for losses which might be sustained by the passengers or
the merchandise if the aircraft is in navigable condition when it departs
and the personnel is in accordance with the requirements of Article 16."
The extent of the liability in Argentine,96 is governed by the
provisions of the Customs Law of the Republic in regard to forced
landings, damage to merchandise on board, jettisoning of baggage,
and the like, on navigable rivers.97
But in addition to whatever responsibility may be incurred under
the respective laws for injury to passengers, merchandise or property
owners on the surface, in some countries9" the tribunal having jur90. Art. 53, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925.

91.
92.

Art. 54, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925.
Art. 48, Decree of July 22, 1925.

93. Art. 74, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
June 21,

On "Quasi-Crimes."
Art. 45, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925.
Art. 94, Decree of July 30, 1926.
Arts. 856-969, and Arts. 1274-1367, Codigo de Comercio, Argentine.
Art. 70, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile; Art. 73, Law No. 13,477 of
1920.
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isdiction of the cause is given power to order the cancellation* of
(a) the navigation permit, (b) the license of the guilty party, if a
member of the crew, and (c) the franchise of the company; or (d)
to confiscate the apparatus and its contents.
The suit for damages may be brought: (a) where the injury
is done; (b) at the place of registration of the aircraft; and (c) in
the domicile of the owner, or legal situs of the operating company.90
If the question involved is the damage done to an aircraft in transit,
the tribunal of the place where the craft is forced down will be considered as competent to take jurisdiction of the cause. 100
B.

Penal Responsibility

In addition to the civil responsibility that might be incurred,
there is the penal responsibility that may attach either to the owner,
the commander, or the pilot, or to all of them, for offences of the
following description:
The owner may be penally liable: (a) for permitting the aircraft to navigate without having previously secured certificates of
registration and airworthiness; (b) if the air plane is not provided
with the marks of nationality and registration;and (c) if the certificate of airworthiness has expired.10'
Like the owner, the commander of the aircraft may incur the
sanctions of the penal law: (a) for commanding the vessel without
possessing the evidence of fitness and capacity, and without carrying the certificate of registration of the craft; (b) for destroying
any of the books required to be carried aboard the vessel, or making false and misleading entries therein; (c) for violating the aerial
regulations or other instructions issued by the proper authorities, 02
such as carrying photographic instruments wi.thout the 0 required
permit ;1s and (d) for placing false marks on the aircraft.' '
The sanctions of the penal laws apply to the pilot: (a) for
conducting the aircraft without observing certain requirements of
99. Art. 55, par. 1, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile; Art. 68, Law No.
13,477 of June 21, 1920, Venezuela.
100. Art. 56, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile.
101. Art. 90, par. 1, Decree of July 22, 1925, Brazil; Art. 61, Decree of
Oct. 17, 1925, Chile.
102. Art. 90, par. 2, Decree of July. 22, 1925, Brazil; Arts. 63 and 64,
Decree of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile; Art. 60, par. 1, Law No. 13,477 of June 21,
1920, Venezuela.
103. Art. 62, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile.
104. Art. 58, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile.
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the local air laws ;'105 (b) for flying over prohibited zones; 1°0 and
107
(c) for reckless flying.
In addition to the criminal responsibility of the owner, the
commander, and the pilot, a like responsibility may be incurred by
those who on board an aircraft: (a) indulge in "acts or omissions"
punishable by the laws ;"o8 (b) unnecessarily jettison articles likely
to cause damage to persons or property on the ground;109 and (c)
as to the aircraft: its detention may be ordered if it cannot produce the certificate of airworthiness or has no marks of identification. 1 ' The provisions of the Penal Codes apply to those guilty
of forging any of the documents required to be carried on board.""
C.

The Formula of "Analogy" as a Source of Law

The legislators of Latin America, in common with those of
other countries, have been somewhat hesitant to undertake the task
-a very formidable task, to be sure-of formulating Codes of law
suitable for the peculiar conditions of aerial navigation. In attempting to regulate it, they have found it necessary to provide for
the application to it, by the formula of legal and factual analogy,
of such rules of the. civil, maritime and penal legislation in force
in the respective countries, as are applicable. Crude as the expedient may be, the want of legislative prevision of the contingencies
that may arise in the novel field of aerial navigation, prevents the
framing, at this time, of a complete Code of laws for exclusive application to this type of communication. The utmost that the wisdom of the legislator has been able to do in this field, is to lay down
certain elementary principles in the air regulations, and to provide
that when the rules thus given are found inadequate to deal with unexpected situations of law, recourse shall be had to the rules prescribed by the Codes for other cases factually analogous. This application of the rules of the Codes by analogy to cases for which
no legal provision has been made, is, to the civil jurist, nothing more
than the application of an existing principle of law to cases which
the legislative wisdom has not foreseen, but which the courts, through
reasons of social interest, will extend to those cases. 1 12
105. Ip Brazil, for instance, for not complying with Art. 49, of the
Decree of July 22, 1925.
106. Art. 90, par. 3, Decree of July 22, 1925, Brazil.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Arts. 57 and 60, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile.
Art. 60, Law No. 13,477 of June 21, 1920, Venezuela.
Art. 67, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile.
Art. 59, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925, Chile.
Art. 94, Decree of July 22, 1925, Brazil.
App. 9, p. 505, Codigo Civil, Peru, de la Lama's ed. (1920, 5th).
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But were the air laws silent upon this question, we discover
in the Civil Codes of Latin America, provisions somewhat in substance like this one in the Peruvian' Code:"'
"The courts cannot suspend or decline the administration of justice,
on account of the absence, vagueness, or insufficiency of the laws; but
shall, in such cases, proceed to a decision, taking into consideration:
.

.

.

2d., other provisions respecting analogous cases; and, 3rd., the

general principles of law."
Thus we see that whether by force of the air regulations or of
the Codes, the "invisible radiation," as Mr. Justice Holmes would
say, 14' of the formula of "legal analogy," will be felt in all those
special cases which have escaped the attention of the legislator, or
where he has shown a general deficiency of juristic concepts about
the subject matter.
The existing Codes which it has been specially provided in
the air regulations shall apply by force of analogy, are:
(1)

Civil Code

Brazil" ' provides:
"The provisions of the Civil Code and the Code of Commerce
applicable to national vessels are equally applicable to aircraft."' 1 6
(2)

Commerce Code

In Chile," 7
"The promoter of aerial transportation is subject to the provisions
of Title V of the Code of Commerce concerning transportation by land,
by sea, by canal, or by navigable rivers, in so far as they are not in
contravention of the provisions of this text." 118
Somewhat similar is the provision of the Brazilian law," 8 that the
responsibility of the air carrier with respect to the merchandise
transported shall be determined "by the rules established for transportation by rail and by the rules of the Code of Commerce," in
so far as applicable and not contrary to the regulations relative to
20

air navigation.1

113. Art. IX, Tit. Prelm., Codigo Civil. See also: Art. 1, secs. 15 and
16, Tit. I, Codigo Civil, Argentine; Art. 7, Intro., Civil Code, Brazil.
114. Missouri v. Holland (1920) 252 U. S. 416.
115. Art. 18, Decree of July 22, 1925.
116. Art. 825,. Civil Code, Brazil; and Arts. 457-796, Codigo Commercial
Brazileiro.
117. Art. 43, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925.
118. Arts. 1084-1168, Codigo de Comercio, Chile.
119. Art. 73, Decree of July 22, 1925.
120. Arts. 457-796, Codigo Commercial Brazileiro.
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(3)

Penal Code

In Brazil, again, the law 121 prescribes that:
"The sanctions provided in the Penal Code in regard to crimes
and comagainst the safety in the use of the means of transportation
' 12 2
munication, are applicable to aerial navigation.
(4)

Maritime Law

The parent Convention of 1919, which has already been ratified
by 'Chile and Uruguay, contains the following specific provision in
regard to salvage :123
"With regard to the salvage of aircraft lost at sea, the principles
of maritime law will apply, in the absence of any agreement to the
contrary."
And Chile,' 24 always abreast of the latest developments in air law,
provides:
ap"The laws concerning shipwreck and maritime salvage are
1 25
plicable to aircraft in danger in the open sea and on the coast.'
But as expressing what may be regarded as the general legislative
sense of the Latin American republic, we quote the Pan American
Convention of 1928 :126
"The salvage of aircraft lost at sea shall be regulated, in the
absence of any agreement to the contrary, by the principles of maritime law."
The grant in Costa Rica, 127 of a franchise to private parties for
the establishing of air transport service is subject to the laws in
force concerning Maritime Commerce, which shall apply by "legal
analogy," to the extent that such laws are "applicable to the spe' 2
cial conditions presented by Maritime Commercial Aviation.' 1
121. Art. 93, Decree of July 22, 1925.

Art. 1, sec. 16, Tit. I, of the

Codigo Civil of Argentine, limits the application of the formula of "analogy"
to civil cases only. See also: The Nation v. Castillo r19191, 27 Gaceta
Judicial 117, 3a, Sup. Ct. Colombia.
122. Arts. 149-155, Penal Code of Brazil
123. Art. 23.

124. Art. 49, Decree of Oct. 17, 1925.
125. Arls. 1150-1167, Codigo de Comercio, Chile.
126. Art. 26.
127. Art. 12, Agreement with Alfonso Altschul Tietjen, vol. 2, year
1925, Coleccion de Leyes y Decretos, pp. 526, 531.

128.

Arts. 530-940, Codigo de Comercio, Costa Rica.
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(5)

Customs and Sanitary Regulations

Provision is made in Argentine by the regulations of September
4, 1925,129 and by those of July 30, 1926,"30 that:

"Any aircraft flying over the national territory, and the crew and
passengers thereon, are subject to the obligations imposed by the customs and sanitary legislation of Argentine, and must abide by the
orders of the police and customs offices."
Colombia, in turn, has enacted... that import trade carried on by
aircraft must comply with the provisions of the Tariff Law, 3 2 and
the Law concerning the Customs of the Republic."'
It may, of course, be, as it has been, objected, that the application of the formula of 'legal analogy," is neither accurate nor complete. There is, no doubt, some truth in the objection; but that objection may be disposed of thus: If the provisions of the Codes
now in force are not applied by analogy to cases arising in the domain of aerial navigation, and there are no legislative provisions to
govern those cases, how are the respective rights and obligations
.of interested parties, such as the State, the carrier, passengers, consignors and consignees, crews, and those whose personal and proprietary rights may have been invaded by the air carrier, to be adjusted? Surely, to leave those rights and obligations unenforced
because of a vacuum in the law of aerial navigation, would, by far,
be a greater social evil than such as might -result from supplying
the deficiency by analogy from other Codes. We recognize the
need of a complete Code on aerial law; but jurists and legislators
are yet too bewildered by the unexpected momentum of air navigation to betake themselves earnestly to the task of codifying what
might be deemed suitable principles of law for its regulation. The
factual and legal analogy may not be altogether accurate or complete, but, in a practical sense, there is enough of it in certain cases
to warrant the application of the formula. And let us remind ourselves in this connection that the Latin American jurists entertain
no fears that, from the application of the rules of the Codes to
analogous cases in air navigation, "precedents," in the Common
Law acceptation of that word, may be created that might ultimately
interfere with the independent development of a body of air law
proper. "Judicial decisions possess no obligatory force except in
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Art. 13.
Art. 83.
Arts. 16 and 17, Decree No.559 of March 15, 1920.
Law No. 117, Dec. 6, 1913.
Law No. 85, Dec. 9, 1915.
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the cases in which they were rendered."' ," They do not constitute
a legal doctrine binding upon the judiciary for all time; they are,
at the most, the opinions of men learned in the law and entitled
as such to respectful consideration. l 85
(IV)
CLASSIFICATION

It is but natural that international conventions and local legislation on aerial navigation should attempt some classification of,
the sort of ownership, in the light of the service rendered, of which
this new type of conveyance may be the object. Classification here
has become as necessary as in the case of ships and similar means of
transportation affected with a public interest, in order to determine
the measure of control that the local authorities may exercise over
them and avoid international complications. By analogy to vessels,
aircraft have been classified into:
A.

Public, State, or Official

By public, or state, or official (terms which we use interchangeably), we understand that the aircraft are: (1) Owned 36 either by
(a) the General Government (the Union, in federal republics), (b)
the States or provinces (meaning, of course, the major political
divisions of the country), or (c) the Municipalities (or local subdivisions) ; (2) in the Military; or (3) in the Administrative', service, such as (i) posts, (ii) customs, and (iii) police. With respect
to aircraft in this category, there can be no doubt that the principles
of public law applicable to vessels similarly circumstanced will also
.apply1 88
134. Art. 3, par. 2, Tit. Prel., Codigo Civil, Chile; Art. 17, Ch. 3, Titl.

Prel., Codigo Civil, Colombia.

135. App. 9, p. 511, Codigo Civil, Peru.

tucion Argentina [1907], par. 543, p. 534.

See also: de Vedia's Consti-

136. Art. 1, Decree of July 30, 1926, Argentine; Art. 4, par. 1, Decree
of July 22, 1925, Brazil; Art. 14, Decree of April 21, 1928, Cuba; Art. 1971,
Codigo Administrativo, Panama; Art. 28, Law No. 13,477 of June 21, 1920,

Venezuela.

137. .Art. 4, Decree of July 22, 1925, Brazil; Art. 2, Decree No. 559,
March 15, 1920, Colombia; Art. 2, Decree of, Oct. 17, 1925, Chile; Art. 14,
Decree of April 21, 1928, Cuba; Art. 70, Law No. 13,477 of June 21, 1920,
Venezuela; Art. 30, C. I. N. A.; Art. 30, C. I. A. N. A.; Art. 3, PanAmerican Convention.
138. Puente, International Law as Applied to Foreign States (1928),
p. 45.
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B.

Private

This category includes aircraft (1) Owned"9 and operated by
(.a) a person, partnership, corporation, or other civil or mercantile
private institution for profit; or (2) engaged 40 in (a) Commercial
(such as the carriage of persons or merchandise), (b) Instructional,
(c) Sportive, or (d) Experimental, service. This type of aircraft
does not come under the classification of "public utility," as that term
is understood in Latin America.'," They are subject, in the full
sense of the law, to the express provisions and implications of the
local legislation.
Some countries have undertaken to classify aircraft, in addition to public and private, into:
C.

General

This classification, is intended to cover aircraft engaged essentially in the public transport of passengers or freight, as contradistinguished from the private transport of persons or things
for the sole benefit of the owner or operator. 1 42 It must be pub1 44
licly owned,142 and is regarded as a "public utility."'
There seems to be no doubt of the right of the State, under
the power of eminent donwin, to expropriate privately-owned aircraft in cases of national necessity. 4 ' The law in Colombia 48 authorizes the Nation, "in case of war, to appropriate to its service
all aviation material, upon indemnifying its owners on the basis of
its cost, according to the invoices, estimates and conditions." The
same law exists in Salvador, 4 7 with this difference: that the ex139. Art. 4, par. 2, Decree of July 22, 1925, Brazil; Art. 2, Decree of
Oct. 17, 1925, Chile; Art. 14, Decree of April 21, 1928, Cuba; Art. 1971,
Codigo Administrativo, Panama.
140. Art. 1, Decree of July 30, 1926, Argentine; Art. 4, par. 2, Decree
of July 22, 1925, Brazil; Art. 2, Decree No. 559, March 15, 1920, Colombia;
Art. 14, Decree of April 21,1928, Cuba; Art. 30, Law No. 13,477 of June 21,
1920, Venezuela.
141. Art. 34, Law No. 13,477 of June 21, 1920, Venezuela.
142. Arts. 28 and 30, Law No. 13,477 of June 21, 1920, Venezuela;
Art. 1, Decree of July 30, 1926, Argentine.
143. Art. 32, Law No. 13,477 of June 21, 1920, Venezuela.
144. Art. 32, Law No. 13,477 of June 21, 1920, Venezuela; Art. 7,
Agreement of Costa Rica with Tietjen, vol. 2, year 1925, Coleccion de Leyes
y Decretos, pp. 526, 531.
145. Art. 17, Constitution of Argentine (1860) ; Art. 72, sec. 17, Constitution of Brazil (1891) ; Arts. 32 and 33, Constitution of Colombia (1911) ;
Art. 15, Constitution of Costa Rica (1917) Art. 26, par. 4, Constitution of
Ecuador (1906) Arts. 66 and 67, Constitution of Honduras (1925) ; Art. 27,
par. 2, Constitution of Mexico (1917) ; Arts. 38 and 39, 'Constitution of
Peru (1920); Art..144, Constitution of Uruguay (1887).
146. Art. 12, Law No. 126, Dec. 31, 1919.
147. Art. 3, Decree of May 17, 1923.
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propriation may be effected not only in case of war, but also of
"rebellion, or sedition, or revolutionary attempts from the outside."
No provision exists in the Aviation Law of Salvador for indemnifying the owner, in view, perhaps, of the fact that the right to compensation is safeguarded by the National Constitution. 1 48

All the International Conventions on aerial navigation contain
a provision like this :149

"All State aircraft, other than military, naval, customs and police
aircraft shall be treated as private aircraft and as such shall be subject
to all the provisions of the present Convention."
The principle of the provision is a very important one from the
point of view of international law, as it limits the privilege of sovereign immunity from foreigri judicial process only to aircraft engaged in a recognized governmental service, which the signatories
have properly kept within the bounds of the executive and administrative prerogatives enumerated in the conventions. Heretofore,
the established law had been that: "the property possessed by a
government, be it owned or requisitioned, engaged in enterprises not
strictly governmental, but partaking more of a commercial nature,
for profit, is not deprived of the privilege, decreed by international
comity, of immunity from the process of arrest."1 ' Under the
terms of these conventions, aircraft engaged in "General" service,
such as we have described above, will be* amenable to judicial or
executive process or action in a foreign country.
148. Arts. 18 and 31.
149. Att. 30, C. I. N. A.; Art. 30, C. I. A. N. A.; Art. 3, Pan-American
Convention.
150. Puente, International Law as Applied to Foreign States (1928),
p. 70. Article 43 of the Codigo Civil of Argentine, provides: "No criminal
or civil actions for the recovery of damages can be brought against juristic
persons, even though their members collectively or their managers individually
have committed criminal offenses which redound to the benefit of said juristic
,persons." By article 33, "juristic persons" are, among others, the State, the
Federal Provinces, and the Municipalities in each Province. See also: Mazza
et al. v. Fisco Nacional (1916) 124 Fallos Sup. Ct. (Arg.) 39; Gartner v.
Buenos Aires (1910) 113 Fallos Sup. Ct. (Arg.) 144. But compare: Banco
de Londres y Bragil v. Gobierno Nacional (1918) 129 Fallos Sup. Ct. (Arg.)
5; Law No. 3952, of 1900, Argentine. For a criticism of the doctrine of
State Immunity, see: La Responsabilidad del Estado, by Arturo Barcia Lopez,
in vol. 23 Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras (1921, Argentine), 483. See
also: American Trading Co. v. Government of the United States of Mexico
(1924) 5 Fed. (2d) 659, affirmed in 264 U. S. 440; Berizzi Bros. Co. v.
SS. Pesaro (1926) 271 U. S.562; The Porto Alexandre (1920) L. R. Prob.
30 A. C.; The Gagara (1919) Prob. 95; The Annette (1919) Prob. 105;
Compania Mercantil Argentina v. United States Shipping Board (1924) K. B.
816, 40 L. T. 601, A. C.; Position of Foreign States before French 'Courts
(1929), Eleanor Wyllys Allen, pp. 1, 24; Position of Foreign States before
German Courts (1928), Eleanor Wyllys Allen, p. 24.
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V.
NATIONALITY

The C. I. N. A. of 1919,1"1 has provided, by analogy to Maritime Law, 1 2 that:

"Aircraft possess the nationality of the State on the register of
which they are entered."
The C. I. A. N. A. of 1926,"'3 has done nothing more than to restate, ipsissima verba, on this as on almost every other point, the
words of the -Convention of 1919. The Pan-American Convention
of 1928, which is of more immediate practical interest to the Latin
American republics, states the principle thus:164
"Aircraft shall have the nationality of the State in which they are
registered and can not be validly registered in more than one State."
These are, of course, principles incorporated in international conventions to which the great majority of the Powers are parties. But
the same idea is found in the legislation of many States. For instance, the Cuban law" 5' says that:
"Aircraft shall, for the purpose of aerial navigation, have the
nationality of the State in which they are registered."
The Argentine law,'

says:

"The nationality of aircraft for legal effects, is that of the country
of registration."
In Chile we meet with very detailed provisions' 17 relative to the
registration and nationality of aircraft. Article 7 of its law provides that:
"Chilian nationality, be it original or acquired by naturalization, is
required of every owner of Chilian aircraft. But foreigners may be
owners if domiciled in Chile and engaged in commerce, industry or a
profession."

By article 10 of the same law, aircraft already registered in a foreign country cannot be inscribed in the national register; and in the
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event of the simultaneous registration of an aircraft in Chile and
in some other country, the Chilian registration shall be null and of
no effect.
A clause which is likely to have far-reaching controversial effects in the not distant future, which will likely be adopted with
respect to aircraft, by the other republics of Latin America, is the
so-called "Calvo" clause, found in this form in the aviation law of
Colombia

:158

"Private aviation enterprises established or. to be established in
the territory of the Rupublic, shall be considered as national, and likewise any privately-owned aircraft intended for touring or commerce."
We might merely observe that the tendency is to uphold the validity
of a clause of this character under International Law, and that the
government to which such enterprises or aircraft belong, can interfere only when there has been "a denial or delay of justice," in the
connotations of those words in International Law.159
And so we conclude this cursory analysis of the law of aerial.
navigation in Latin America.
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